Women are underrepresented in leadership positions in business, politics, and in the academic and scientific community. Not taking advantage of the skills of highly qualified women constitutes a waste of talent and, consequently, a loss of economic growth potential. To design effective policy interventions that empower women to reach leadership positions, it is crucial to identify at which levels of the career ladder they should be introduced. In a laboratory experiment, we run a two-stage tournament to evaluate the impact of three different interventions on women's willingness to compete for top positions. We find that, compared with no intervention, a gender quota introduced at the initial stage is ineffective in encouraging women to compete for the top, while quotas introduced in the final stage of competition or in both stages increase women's willingness to compete for the top, without distorting the performance of the winners.
Text
Women are underrepresented in leadership positions in business, politics, and in the academic and scientific community, while they are overrepresented in mid-skill occupations 1,2 .
Differences between men's and women's careers often emerge at an early stage and endure in women, who also experience fewer opportunities for career advancement. Even in those countries ranked at top positions in the Global Gender Gap Index 3 for providing women and men with equal opportunities, such as the Scandinavian countries, women are still underrepresented in top managerial positions, suggesting that gender equality of opportunities does still not ensure equality of outcomes.
Several studies have identified multiple explanations for the existence of the gender gap in top positions. Discrimination and gender stereotypes 4, 5 as well as a different trade-off between men and women formulating their career and family plans [6] [7] [8] may prevent women from climbing the career ladder. Women are also found to perceive themselves as less qualified to run for political office 9 , expressing lower career-entry and career-peak pay expectations 10, 11 and lower expectations of successfully fulfilling job demand's success compared to men 12 . Recently, researchers have provided evidence of women's weaker inclinations to participate in competition due to different distributional preferences, higher risk aversion, and lower levels of self-confidence compared to men [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] .
Gender inequality comes at a cost. Not taking advantage of the skills of highly qualified women constitutes a waste of talent and, consequently, a loss of economic growth potential. To design effective policy interventions that empower women to reach leadership positions without harming the meritocratic principle, it is crucial to identify at which levels of the career ladder they should be introduced. Policy interventions, such as affirmative action, implemented at entry level, could avoid an early sorting of women, with positive spillovers on the later stages, but could also reinforce women's underconfidence or self-stereotyping, impairing their chances of career advancement.
Affirmative action for upper-level positions may have a cascade effect at lower levels and create role models for future generations, though it could fail to provide sufficient incentives to affect women's career decisions at early stages 18 . Different solutions have been adopted in different countries and job sectors. Quotas introduced at early stages of a career are invoked in male-dominated sectors (e.g., scientific and/or technology-based careers). Interventions at senior levels have been used in Sweden,
where the government has introduced voluntary quotas for universities hiring full professors. The "Cascade Model" introduced in German universities in 2012 is a quota system applying to all levels of academic careers in order to ultimately increase the number of women at the highest level.
Assessing the effect of policy interventions at different stages of a career is difficult, if not impossible, in empirical studies using cross-country analysis or panel data, because the introduction of such interventions can be related to changes in the social attitudes toward women or by women themselves.
Our laboratory-based economic experiments, conducted in an artificial but highly controlled environment, allow to analyze the effect of gender quotas at different levels of a multi-stage tournament resembling a career ladder. We examine the effect of a gender quota in a two-stage tournament at (i) the entry level, (ii) the top level, or (ii) both levels of competition.
The experiment was run with 384 students from various academic backgrounds (N=384). Subjects were randomly assigned to groups of twelve, six men and six women. The experiment was divided in 5 stages.
The experimental task in stages 1-4 was to add as many sets of three three-digit numbers and two decimal numbers as possible within 4 minutes.
In stage 1 (piece rate), subjects received €0.50 for each correct calculation. In stage 2 (compulsory tournament), group members competed against each other. The four members who solved the most calculations were paid €1.50 per correct answer. The other eight group members received nothing. In stages 3 and 4 subjects chose whether they wanted to be paid under a piece rate or a tournament scheme: in the tournament of stage 3, the four best performers received a payoff of €1.50 and the other participants nothing, while in the tournament of stage 4 only the two best performers received a positive payoff, equal to €3. In both stages 3 and 4, if the tournament was chosen, the subject's performance in the task was compared to the other group members' performance in stage 2. Stages 3 and 4 modeled a two-stage tournament replicating a career ladder. In stage 3, subjects chose whether to compete in a tournament or to be paid under a piece rate compensation scheme. In stage 4, only those who had chosen to compete in stage 3 decided whether to continue to compete in the incoming tournament or to apply a piece rate payment to their performance in the task. In stage 4, the tournament payment scheme was applied only to those who had chosen to compete, conditionally on being among the winners of stage 3 of the tournament, while a piece rate was implemented otherwise.
To investigate which policy intervention is more likely to positively affect women's top achievements (i.e., in stage 4, the most competitive tournament), we implement four treatments. In the No-Quota treatment (NQ), winners of the tournaments in stages 3 and 4 are the four and two group members with the largest numbers of correct calculations, regardless of their gender. In the Quota-at-initialstage treatment (Q1), there are at least two women among the four winners of the stage 3 tournament, meaning that the two best performing women are winners, irrespective of their absolute ranking.
Similarly, in the Quota-at-final-stage treatment (Q2), the best performing woman is always one of the two winners in stage 4. In the Quota-at-both-stage treatment (Q1Q2), a gender quota is introduced in both stages, 3 and 4, following the rules described above. In stage 5, we elicit subjects' risk preferences 19 and some socio-demographics information. In each stage, no information about relative performance is given to subjects until the end of the experiment.
In line with similar previous studies (20, 21) , in the compulsory tournament of stage 2 we find that men perform on average better than women, but this difference is not statistically significant (except in Q2, Mann Whitney test, p=0.016). As shown in Fig. 1 Our findings suggest that introducing a quota at stage 3 has the expected direct effect of increasing women's willingness to compete in the tournament at the lowest level of the career, but it does not push them to compete for the top. Fig. 2 For a formal analysis of the determinants of subjects' willingness to compete and the effects of alternative policy interventions, we ran a number of probit regressions, which confirm all of our main findings (see the Extended Data Table 2 ).
The above analysis shows that a gender quota at an initial stage of the career ladder only temporarily increases women`s willingness to compete, thus not encouraging them to compete for the top. On the contrary, in Q2 a quota at the final stage of the career ladder has no effects on the initial stage compared to the NQ treatment, but it induces those women who decided to compete at stage 3 to keep competing because they now have more chances to reach the top. Introducing a quota at both stages, 3 and 4, has the same effect that Q2 has on women`s participation in the top tournament.
To shed more light on the effect of various policy interventions on women`s participation, we focus our attention on the best performing participants, identified as those who gave 5 or more correct answers in stage 4. This threshold, computed by means of numerical simulations, makes the choice of competing payoff maximizing in all treatments. As shown in Fig. 3 As a further analysis, we investigate the effect of gender quotas on the performance of the winners of the competition in stage 4 in order to evaluate the impact of these policies on efficiency. We observe that, taking the NQ treatment as a benchmark, there is no significant difference in the average performance of winners, meaning that the presence of quotas does not distort the pool of the winning candidates. In most developed countries, women's participation in the labor force has matched that of men.
However, there is still a substantial gap both in the percentage of women employed in upper-level positions and when considering wage differentials.
Nowadays, one of the main scopes of gender policies is the promotion of women's leadership achievement in the different sectors of society without violating the meritocratic principle. To achieve this aim, it is extremely important to understand the effect of policy interventions along the different phases of a career path.
The laboratory provides the ideal environment to isolate and highlight possible drawback effects of gender quotas difficult to detect in the field, providing valuable insights for policy makers as well as for private and public companies interested in pursuing gender equality.
Our study supports the effectiveness of gender quotas for the appointment to leading positions but warns that policies limiting their intervention at the entry level of careers might be ineffective. We show that they discourage women from competing in the subsequent stages, undermining their selfconfidence in their ability to successfully climb the career ladder. Our findings suggest that introducing a gender quota at the top successfully prevents best performing women from getting off the career ladder too early, without negatively affecting men`s decisions. Moreover, none of the interventions analyzed have entailed any efficiency loss measured in terms of performance of the winning participants. A policy introducing a gender quota only at the top turns out to be as effective as effective as a policy introducing a quota at all stages of a career. Therefore, under a principle of minimum interference, a policy introducing a gender quota only at the top is more advisable to be introduced as a policy intervention.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the role of gender quotas in a career path framework. Our results, even if obtained in a stylized and abstract environment, show that the stage at which a gender quota is introduced impacts differently on women`s willingness to get to the top.
Further research is needed to complement our findings in order to understand the long-run effect of gender policies. Moreover, it would also be worth analyzing how affirmative action affects relationships within organizations, such as tasks assignment or team working, which are relevant factors in determining women's paths to the top of the career ladder.
Methods

 Experimental design
All treatments were run in a between-subjects design. Subjects were randomly assigned to treatments.
Once arrived in the laboratory, each participant was randomly assigned to one visually isolated computer terminal. Written instructions for the first stage were then distributed to all subjects and read aloud. Instructions about each of the following stages were distributed to the subjects and read aloud only after the completion of the previous stages. Individuals were asked to answer a set of control questions on the screen after each stage.
In stages 2, 3 and 4, ties between participants participating in tournaments were broken randomly.
The method of comparing a subject's competitive performance in stage 3 and stage 4 to the other group members' performance in stage 2 has several advantages. First, tournament entry decisions do not depend on a subject's expectation about the other members' entry decisions, but only on the subject's beliefs about her/his own ability. Second, stage 2 performances are competitive performances, and thus a subject competes against others when they were also exposed to a competitive payment scheme. Third, entering competition does not impose externalities on others. In were actually competing in a tournament or not. Since we were interested in the effect of quotas not only on decision to compete but also on the participants' performance, we decided to provide subjects with this information. In the second, we could have decided to disclose all the information about stage 3 competition, i.e. the relative ranking and performance of subjects. In this case, they would also have known whether the outcome would have been different without the policy intervention (if any). We decided not to give such explicit feedback because we wanted to better represent the way competitions work in reality. For instance, when candidates are informed about the outcome of a job application, they find out whether they have been successful or not and can also find out the identity of the successful candidate(s), but typically do not receive any precise information about their relative ranking.
At the end of stage 3, after participants have submitted the choice of the payment scheme for stage 4
(but before they are informed about whether they are among the winner of the stage 3 competition and before performing the task in stage 4), we elicited the beliefs of all subjects regarding their relative ranks in stage 2. Subjects had to indicate their expected rank within the whole group of twelve members, but also within the sub-group composed by members of their own gender only (i.e. six members). Correct guesses were rewarded with €1 each, and the feedback was given only at the end of the experiment.
Subjects did not receive any feedback on their relative ranking in the compulsory competition in stage 2 or in the competition in stage 3 and in stage 4 until the very end of the experiment. In each stage, they were only informed about the absolute number of correctly solved exercises. This was done in order to avoid that subjects conditioned their choices on previous outcomes of competition. It is important to note that in stage 4 subjects received feedback about whether they had won or lost the competition in stage 3, but not about their relative ranking. As evidenced in point 4) of this list subjects made their choice of the compensation scheme to be applied in stage 4 before knowing whether they were among the winners of stage 3`s competition or not.
After stage 5, the experimental sessions included a second part. In Part 2 we measure the possible spillovers of gender quotas on subsequent dishonest behavior using a variation of the die under-thecup task (Shalvi et al., 2011). In our experiment, reporting an odd number results in getting €4 while reporting an even number results in getting €1. We do not discuss the results from this part in this paper.
In order to avoid wealth effects, one stage among stages 1 to 4 of Part 1 was randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment and added to the earnings of stage 5 of part 1 and the ones of part 2. Each subject also received a show-up fee of €5. The average payoff per subject was €17.
Before proceeding with payment to the subjects, we asked participants to fill out a demographic form.
 Statistics
Frequencies of winning and ex-ante win probabilities
In the main text, we define best-performing participants those subjects who gave 5 or more correct answers in stage 4. This threshold makes the choice of competing payoff maximizing in all treatments, as shown in the Extended Data Table 1 .
In order to define this threshold for the NQ treatment, we calculate the women (men)`s frequency of winning for each level of performance, when drawing 500,000 groups consisting of 6(5) men and 5(6) women, using the performance distribution in stage 2 of the entire sample (i.e. 384 participants) with replacement. We compare the frequencies of winning obtained in this way with the ex-ante stage 3 and 4 tournaments' win probabilities, that is 4/12=0.33 and 2/12=0.17. When, for a specific level of performance, the frequencies of winning obtained via simulations are higher than the ex-ante win probabilities, we conclude that choosing to compete would be a payoff maximizing choice for the participants with that specific level of performance.
Panels a) and b) of the Extended Data Table 1 show the probability of winning stage 3 and stage 4 competition conditional on stage 2's performance for both men and women in the different treatments.
Note that the frequencies of winning in stage 3 and stage 4 for men is not affected by treatments, while for women it varies depending on the treatment. In particular, in the treatments where the gender quota is introduced in stage 3 (Q1 and Q1Q2), in order to be a winner of the tournament in stage 3, for a woman it is enough to be among the two best performers out of the six women in stage 2.
Similarly, when the quota is introduced in stage 4 (Q2 and Q1Q2) to be the winner of the tournament in stage 4, it is sufficient to be the best women in the group of 6 women.
From the Extended Data Table 1 it can be noted that giving 4 (5) or more correct answers represents the threshold that makes the choice of competing in stage 3 (4) payoff maximizing in all treatments and for both genders. What changes for women, after the introduction of the quotas, is that the frequencies of winning increase for each level of performance (i.e. for a performance of 3 is increases from 2.31 to 11.81 in stage 3), but not so much to exceed the ex-ante probabilities of winning, altering the threshold. For men in all treatments (and women in the NQ treatment): for any given performance level, say, 3 for a man (woman), we draw 500,000 groups consisting of 5(6) men and 6(5) women, using the performance distribution of the 192 men and 192 women with replacement. We then calculate the man's (woman's) frequency of wins in this set of simulated groups. For women in the treatments with quota: for any given performance level, say, 3 for a woman, we draw 500,000 groups consisting of 5 women, using the performance distribution of the 192 women with replacement. We then calculate the woman's frequency of wins in this set of simulated groups of women applying the rules of the quota in the different stages. Note that the introduction of a quota increases the frequency of winning for women, but not as much to exceed the ex-ante win probabilities. For this reason, the thresholds which make the choice to compete payoff-maximizing do not change across genders and treatments.
Best-Performing participants
Since we focus on the intervention which encourage women to reach the top-positions, we identify as best-performing participants those who, in stage 4, met the threshold previously identified (i.e.
who gave 5 or more correct answers). Irrespective from the gender and the treatments, for these participants, competing in stage 4 would have been the payoff-maximizing choice.
A set of Fisher's exact test confirm that, for the best-performing participants, the distribution of performances does not vary across treatments, (overall, p=0.290; men, p=0.705; women, p= 0.671).
An alternative method to identify best-performing participants would have been to consider those subjects who gave 5 or more correct answers in stage 2. Using this classification our results are qualitatively unchanged, as displayed in the Extended Data For this reason, we decide to define the best-performing participants by considering those subjects who gave 5 or more correct answers in stage 4.
Regression analysis
In order to analyze the determinants of the entry choices in sage 4 competition, we estimate a probit model of the form: Stage 2) and Willingness to take risk (Bomb). We also control for the competitiveness Index 22, 23 .
Φ(⋅)
is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. In the Extended Data Table   2 we report the results from estimating (1) based on different sets of controls.
In column (1) we only control for the gender and the different treatments. We find that, with respect to the NQ treatment, both Q2 and Q1Q2 treatments have a positive and significant effect on the choice to compete in stage 4 while Q1 treatment has no significant effect. We also find a significant gender gap, indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of the dummy female.
In column (2) we add the participant's performance in stage 2, which turns out to be positive and significant, while other results are unchanged with respect to column (1). In column (3) we add beliefs about own performance in stage 2. The coefficient of this variable has a negative and significant effect, suggesting that the biggest the rank participants think to have, the lowest the probability for them to continue competing. When looking at the other independent variables we observe a reduction in the significance of the gender dummy, suggesting that part of the gender gap can be explained by men and women holding different beliefs about their relative ranking. We also find that the variable accounting for the performance in stage 2 does not achieve significance, suggesting that what matters in explaining the decision to compete is not the performance per se, but the participants` beliefs about their ability.
When adding the interaction terms between the treatment and gender in column (4), we observe that being a female in the NQ treatment diminishes the probability to enter competition in stage 4, as suggested by the significant coefficient of the female variable. Moreover, the significant coefficients of the interaction terms femalexQ2 and femalexQ1Q2 indicate the extent to which the difference in entering competition in stage 4 between males and females changes in the Q2 and Q1Q2 treatments, respectively, with respect to the NQ treatment. Finally, in column (5) we observe that the more competitive participants are, the more likely they will enter competition, as expected (competitiveness is captured by the competitiveness index). All the coefficients of the treatments variables are not significant, showing that males` behavior is not affected by the treatment, except in treatment Q1Q2, where males are even more likely to access competition in stage 4 with respect to the NQ treatment.
Overall, the results in columns (1) to (5) of the Extended Data Table 2 suggest that the beliefs about own ability can explain part of the differences in competition entry choices in Stage 4. However, in models (1)- (4) the dummy for the gender difference is still negative and significant, while the statistically significant residual gender gap in entry decisions disappears in column (5) Error bars, mean  SEM. 
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Part 1 -Instructions Task
Your task in Part 1 is to solve correctly as many addition exercises as possible. To be more precise, you will have 4 minutes' time in order to solve as many additions of three randomly selected three-digit numbers and two decimal numbers as possible, by entering the sum of the five numbers. You will face a screen as the one depicted below.
Calculators or mobile phones are not allowed; however, you can make use of the provided scratch paper. Once you are ready, you can submit an answer by typing it in the box and clicking the submit button. When you enter an answer the computer will immediately tell you whether your answer is correct or not. Your answers are anonymous.
Earnings for Part 1
In part 1 you get 50 cents per addition exercise you solve correctly in the 4 minutes. Your payment does not decrease if you provide an incorrect answer. We refer to this payment as the Piece Rate payment.
If Part 1 is randomly selected for the final payment you will obtain the money earned in part 1 under the Piece Rate payment.
What happens now?
If you have any questions on part 1, please push the red button on your left at any moment during the experiment, an assistant will come to your seat to answer your questions in private.
Before starting the task, you will be asked to answer a few questions to verify your understanding.
After the control questions, you will have one minute in order to familiarize yourselves with the task. During this time, you can solve addition exercises, which do not count for your earnings.
Once the practice time is terminated, you will be informed when Part 1 is going to start.
Part 2 -Instructions Task
In Part 2 you will be given 4 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of three randomly selected three-digit numbers and two decimal numbers.
Earnings for Part 2
For this Part your payment depends on your performance relative to that of a group of other participants. Groups are formed randomly at the beginning of this Part and each participant stays in the same group until the end of the experiment.
Allocation in groups:
Each group consists of 12 participants, 6 of whom are men and 6 are women. Each group member receives an identification code. All members keep their identification code for the entire experiment. The 6 women randomly receive the identification code F1, F2, F3, F4, F5 or F6. The 6 men randomly receive the identification code M1, M2, M3, M4, M5 or M6. You will not find out the identity of the other participants in your group during or after the experiment, so that all decisions remain anonymous.
In Part 2 your earnings depend on the number of addition exercises you solve compared to the eleven other people in your group. The 4 individuals who correctly solve the largest number of addition exercises are the 4 winners of the tournament.
The 4 winners receive €1.50 per correct addition exercise, while the other participants do not receive any payment. In case of a tie, the ranking among the members with equal performances is determined randomly. We refer to this as the Tournament payment.
During the task and at the end of Part 2, you will only be informed about the number of your correct answers, but you will not be informed of whether you were among the winners of the tournament until all four parts of the experiment have been completed.
If Part 2 is randomly selected for the final payment, then your earnings depend on whether you were among the 4 winners in the tournament or not.
What happens now?
Before continuing, you will be asked to answer a few questions to verify your understanding.
Part 3 -Instructions Task
In Part 3, as in the previous two parts, you will be given 4 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of three randomly selected three-digit numbers and two decimal numbers. The rules to perform the task are the same as in Part 1 and Part 2.
Earnings for Part 3
In Part 3 you will now get to choose which of the two previous payments (i.e. the Piece Rate or the Tournament payment) you prefer to apply to your performance in the task.
[Quota] The Tournament of Part 3, however, will be different from the one you just experienced in Part 2, since it contains a gender quota. This means that a certain number of winning positions are reserved for women. We will refer to it as QTournament payment. We will explain you in detail the rules of the Q-Tournament below.
Moreover, your decision in Part 3 also affects the decision you will face in Part 4. Therefore, before making your choice for the payment in Part 3, further instructions about Part 4 will be given in the following.
 Earnings in Part 3 if you choose the Piece Rate payment scheme: you receive 50 cents per addition exercise you correctly solve.  Earnings in Part 3 if you choose the Tournament payment scheme: your performance will be evaluated in comparison with the performance of the other eleven group members in Part 2. As a reminder: Part 2 is the one that you have just completed. There will be 4 winners in the tournament of Part 3. Whether or not you are among them is determined as follow.
[NoQuota] If you enter more correct answers than 8 of your group members did in Part 2, then you will receive € 1.50 per correct answer (i.e., 3 times the Piece Rate payment). In other words, only 3 members of your group can have a Part 2-performance which is higher than your Part 3-performance, otherwise you receive no payment for this Part. In case of a tie, the ranking among the members with equal performances is determined randomly.
[Quota] In each group, two of the 4 winners are in any case the 2 women with the best performance (of all 6 women). The other 2 winners are the group member with the best performance among the remaining members (i.e. excluding the 2 best-performing women). In case of ties, the ranking among the members with equal performances is randomly determined. If you are among the winners you will receive € 1.50 per correct answer (i.e., 3 times the Piece Rate payment), otherwise you receive no payment for this Part.
We now give an example, in order to illustrate the way that the winners are determined in the Q-Tournament. In order to compare your Part 3-performance with Part 2 performance of the other members of your group we do the following: we replace your Part 3-performance to your performance in Part 2 and we re-rank the group`s members according to their performance. So the new ranking is determined by your performance in part 3 and the performance of other eleven members of your group in part 2.
We obtain a new ranking where males and females can be ranked according to their performance.
MD 5) ME 6) MF Where FA is the best performing woman and FF is the worst performing woman. In the same way, MA is the best performing man and MF the man with the worst performance. The two women with the best performance, FA and FB, are definitely two of the four winners of the QTournament. In order to determine the other two winners, we must find out who are the other two group members with the best performance among the remaining ten ones (besides FA and FB). Hence, there are at least 2 women and at most 2 men as winners in a Q-Tournament.
In summary
A woman is a winner of the Q-Tournament if she has a better Part 3-performance than: i) the other 4 women in her group in Part 2, OR ii) 8 members of her group in Part 2.
A man is a winner of the Q-Tournament if he has a better Part 3-performance than i) the other 4 men in his group in s, AND ii) 8 members of his group in Part 2
After the task, you will only be informed about the number of your correct answers but you will not be informed about whether you were among the winner of the [NoQuota:
If Part 3 is randomly selected for the final payment, then your earnings depend on the choice of the payment and on your performance in this task. Now, before to continue, we will explain how your choice in Part 3 affects the choices you can do in Part 4.
Part 4 -Instructions
The decision you make about the payment you want to be applied to your performance in Part 3 also affects the decision you will face in Part 4.
Task
In Part 4, you will be again given 4 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of three randomly selected three-digit numbers and two decimal numbers. The rules to perform the task are the same as in the three previous parts. In each group, one of the 2 winners is in any case the woman with the best performance (of all women in her group). The other winner is the group member with the best performance among the remaining members (i.e. excluding the best-performing woman). In case of ties, the ranking among the members with equal performances is randomly determined. We now give an example, in order to illustrate the way that the winners are determined in the Q-Tournament. In order to compare your Part 4-performance with Part 2 performance of the other members of your group we do the following: we replace your Part 4-performance to your performance in Part 2 and we re-rank the group members according to their performance. So the new ranking is determined by your performance in Part 4 and the performance of other seven members of your group in Part 2.
Earnings for
We obtain a new ranking where males and females can be ranked according to their performance. Where FA is the woman with the best performance, and FF is the woman with the worst one. In the same way, MA is the best performing man and MF the man with the worst one. The woman with the best performance, FA, is definitely one of the two winners of the Q-Tournament. In order to determine the other winner, we must find out who is the other group member with the best performance among the remaining seven ones (besides FA).
In summary
A woman is a winner of the Q-Tournament if she has a better Part-4 performance than i) the other 5 women in her group in Part 2, OR ii) 11 members of her group in Part 2.
A man is a winner of the Q-Tournament if he has a better Part-4 performance than i) the other 5 men in his group in Part 2, AND ii) 11 members of his group in Part 2
There is at least 1 woman and at most 1 man as winners in a Q-Tournament.
What happens now?
If you have any questions on Parts 3 and 4, please push the red button on your left at any moment during the experiment, an assistant will come to your seat to answer your questions in private. Before continuing, you will be asked to answer a few questions to verify your understanding.
After that, we will continue with Part 3. First you will be asked to choose whether you want the Piece Rate or the [Quota: Q-Tournament] [NoQuota: Tournament] as a payment to be applied on your Part 3 performance.
________________________________________________________________________
Beliefs elicitation
After the completion of the task in stage 3, participants went to an unannounced stage of incentivized beliefs elicitation. Correct guesses were rewarded with €1 each. The beliefs elicited referred to performances in Task 2. Specifically, we asked subjects to guess their relative ranking within their group of 12 subjects and within the group of 6 subjects with the same gender. We also asked participants whether they expect males to have an average performance higher, lower or equal performance than females to test for their gender stereotypes. _______________________________________________________________________
Part 5 -Instructions
In the fifth part of the experiment, you will see the following screen:
On your left you see a field composed of 100 boxes.
You earn 0.10 Euro for every box that is collected. Every second a box is collected, starting from the top-left corner. Once collected, the box disappears from the screen and your earnings are updated accordingly. At any moment, you can see the amount earned up to that point. Such earnings are only potential, however, because one of these boxes hides a time bomb that destroys everything that has been collected.
You do not know where this time bomb lies. You only know that the time bomb can be in any place with equal probability. Moreover, even if you collect the time bomb, you will not know it until the end of the experiment.
Your task is to choose when to stop the collecting process. You do so by hitting 'Stop' at any time.
The position of the bomb in the paying round has been randomly determined.
If you happen to have collected the box where the time bomb is located, you will earn zero. If the time bomb is located in a box that you did not collect, you will earn the amount of money accumulated when hitting 'Stop'.
If you have any questions on the fifth part, please push the red button on your left.
